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Abstract 
This paper explains the narrowing of gender gaps in wages and market hours in recent 
decades by the growth of the service economy. We propose a model with three sectors: 
goods, services and home production. Women have a comparative advantage in the 
production of services in the market and at home. The growth of the services sector, in turn 
driven by structural transformation and marketization of home services, acts as a gender-
biased demand shift and leads to a rise in women’s wages and market hours relative to men. 
Quantitatively, the model accounts for an important share of the observed rise in women’s 
relative wage and market hours and the fall in men’s market hours. 
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1 Introduction
One of the most remarkable changes in labor markets since World War II is the increase in female
involvement in the labor market. In the US, the employment rate of prime age women has more
than doubled from about 35% in 1945 to 77% at the end of the century, and similar trends
are detected in the majority of OECD countries. These developments have generated a large
literature on the causes, characteristics and consequences of the increase in female participation to
the labor market. There is now a vast literature indicating a number of supply-side explanations
for these trends, including human capital investment, medical advances, technological progress in
the household, and the availability of child care. Also, a recent line of research emphasizes the role
of social norms regarding womens work in shaping the observed decline in gender inequalities.1
In this paper we propose a di¤erent, possibly complement, explanation for the observed trends
in gender gaps, based on the secular expansion of the service economy and its role in raising
the relative demand for female work. Our emphasis on the evolution of the industry structure
is motivated by a number of simple facts. First, the sustained rise in female work since the
late 1960s in the U.S. has been accompanied by a symmetric fall in male work (Figure 1, panel
A), and a rise in the gender wage ratio (Figure 2). Second, the entire (net) rise in womens
hours took place in the broad service sector, while the entire (net) fall in male hours took place
in sectors producing goods, and namely the primary sector, manufacturing, construction and
utilities (Figure 1, Panels C and D). This pattern is closely linked to the reallocation of labor
from goods to service industries (Panel B). Finally, the rise in womens hours in the service sector
is accompanied by a strong decline in their hours of home production (see Figure 3), consistent
with substantial marketization of home production (Freeman and Schettkat, 2005).2 Beyond these
aggregate trends, our estimates also detect a positive and signicant association between the share
of services and both womens relative wages and market hours within U.S. states, thus states in
which the service share rose faster experienced a faster narrowing in gender gaps.
Motivated by these fact, this papers objective is to investigate the role of structural transfor-
mation and marketization for our understanding of changes in gender gaps in wages and market
hours. The interaction between structural transformation, marketization and trends in female
work has been largely overlooked in the literature.3 However there are at least two reasons why
1See Goldin (1990) and Goldin (2006) for comprehensive overviews of historical trends and their causes. See
(among others) Goldin and Katz (2002) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009) for the role of medical progress; Jones,
Manuelli and McGrattan (2003) and Greenwood, Seshadri and Yorukoglu (2005) for the role of technological
progress in the household; Galor and Weil (1996) and Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) for the role of
declining fertility. See nally Fernandez (2011, 2013) and references therein for theory and evidence on cultural
factors.
2See also the discussion in Lebergott (1993, chapter 8) on the link between marketization and consumerism: ...
by 1990 [women] increasingly bought the goods and services they had produced in 1900. Consumerismappeared
when housewifes began to buy goods they had once produced.For evidence on this see Bridgman (2013), who
documents the marked rise in the ratio of services purchased relative to home production since the late 1960s.
3One notable exception is work by Lee and Wolpin (2009), who estimate an equilibrium labor market model and
show that the rise of services is empirical important in understanding changes womens wages and employment.
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these can contribute to the rise in female hours of market work. First, service jobs have tradition-
ally been perceived as more appropriate for women since the early 20th century, as they involved
safer, cleaner working conditions and shorter working hours than jobs in factories (Goldin, 2006).
While these factors may have become less relevant later in the century, other factors have been
suggested to imply that women may still retain a comparative advantage in the service sector,
like the relatively more intensive use of communication skills than in manufacturing, and the less
intensive use of heavy manual skills (Galor and Weil 1996, Rendall 2010). Such comparative ad-
vantage is reected in the initial allocation of womens hours of market work. In 1968, the typical
working woman was supplying three quarters of her market time to the service sector, while the
typical man was supplying only one half of his market time to it. As structural transformation
implies an expansion of the sector in which women have a comparative advantage, this may imply
important consequences for the evolution of womens hours of market work.
The second reason is related to womens involvement in household work. In 1965, women spent
on average 38 hours per week in home production, while men spent only 11 hours. Household
work typically includes child care, cleaning, food preparation, and in general activities that have
close substitutes in the market service sector. If the expansion of the service sector makes it
cheaper to outsource these activities, one should expect a reallocation of womens work from the
household to the market. The work allocation of men and women in the late 1960s is thus key to
understand later developments. While women were mostly working in home production and the
service sector, and thus their market hours were boosted by both structural transformation and
marketization, men were mostly working in the goods sector, and their working hours su¤ered
from the generalized downsizing of this sector.
We propose a model in which both womens relative wages and market hours and the size of
services can be driven by uneven productivity growth across sectors. Goods and market services
are imperfect substitutes in the consumers utility function, as they are inherently di¤erent com-
modities, e.g. cars and childcare in nurseries. Market services and home production, however, are
close substitutes, as they can encompass very similar commodities such as childcare in nurseries
and childcare at home. Male and female labor inputs are imperfect substitutes in all sectors, and
females have a comparative advantage in producing services (both at home and in the market).
The force driving labor market trends is uneven productivity growth, which is highest in the goods
sector, intermediate in market services, and lowest in home production. As goods and market ser-
vices are poor substitutes, faster productivity growth in the goods sector reallocates labor from
goods to services, resulting in structural transformation. As market and home services are good
substitutes, slower productivity growth in the home sector reallocate hours of work from the home
to services, resulting in marketization.4
We derive two novel results. First, due to womens comparative advantage in services, struc-
The force driving the rise in services in their model is an exogenous shock to the value of home time, while we
model changes in the value of home time as endogenously driven by the marketization of home production.
4Consumerism(in the terminology of Lebergott, 1993) is thus driven by falling relative price of market services.
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tural transformation and marketization together play a role similar to a gender-biased shift in
labor demand, driving a rise in womens market hours and wages relative to men. Our models
predictions for both narrowing hours and wage gaps is one key novel element in the literature on
the rise of female labor market participation. Second, for both men and women, market hours rise
with marketization but fall with structural transformation. Thus both processes are necessary to
rationalize trends in hours for both genders, and specically marketization is key to deliver the
rise in female market work while structural transformation is key to deliver the fall in male market
work.
To quantitatively assess the importance of the mechanisms described, we calibrate our model
to the U.S. labor market and then predict the change in the wage ratio and time allocation by
gender and sectors implied by uneven productivity growth. Our baseline model predicts the entire
rise in the service share and 87% of the rise in female hours in services. It also predicts one-third
of the rise in the gender wage ratio and the gender market hours ratio. Finally, it predicts 44%
of the rise in female market hours and 11% of the fall in male market hours. The predictions for
female work improve if the observed gender-specic trends in human capital are incorporated into
the model, and we allow human capital to boost labor productivity in market sectors more than
in the household sector.
While our baseline results conrm that structural transformation is an important source of
gender-biased demand shifts, this process alone cannot explain the whole observed change in
relative wages and the rise in womens market hours relative to men. If we were to introduce an
exogenous gender-biased demand shift similar to that calibrated by Heathcote et al (2010), our
model could predict 82% of the rise in the wage ratio, the whole rise in womens market hours,
and 56% of the fall in mens market hours. This result indicates that other labor demand shifts
that are not considered in our model are also important. These should include, most notably, the
introduction and progressive enforcement of equal treatment laws, which would simultaneously
narrow gender gaps in both wages and hours.
While there are extensive literatures that have independently studied the rise in female labor
market participation and the rise of services, respectively, work on the interplay between the two
phenomena is scant. Early work by Reid (1934), Fuchs (1968) and Lebergott (1993) has suggested
that the two mechanisms could be related, without proposing a unied theoretical framework.
Our work is related to Galor and Weil (1996) and Rendall (2010), who illustrate that the rise in
female employment may result as a consequence of brain-biased technological progress in a one-
sector model in which females have a comparative advantage in the provision of brain (rather than
brawn) inputs. In a similar vein, we assume women have a comparative advantage in producing
services in a model with two market sectors and home production, in which the rise in female
market hours and the share of services are simultaneous outcomes of uneven productivity growth
across sectors.
The marketization of home services, which contributes to both the rise of female market work
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and the share of services, also features in Akbulut (2011) and Rendall (2011). Our main contri-
bution to this strand of literature is that we let the gender wage ratio respond endogenously to
sector-specic productivity growth, while this is exogenous in Akbulut (2011) and Rendall (2011),
as it is also in most of the macro literature on the rise in female participation (Jones et al., 2003,
Greenwood et al., 2004, and Heathcote et al. 2010).
The mechanisms driving the rise in services in our model were rst studied by Ngai and
Pissarides (2008) and Rogerson (2008), who focus on the dynamics of aggregate market hours and
are thus agnostic about diverging trends by gender. Our paper introduces a gender dimension into
their framework and argues that this is key to rationalize gender specic trends in hours of work and
wages. Finally, motivated by a clear cross-country association between the share of services and
female work, a number of papers have taken these ideas to an international perspective (Rogerson,
2005; Rendall, 2011; Olivetti and Petrongolo, 2012) and relate lower female employment rates in
Europe to an undersize service sector relative to the U.S.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data used and documents
relevant trends in gender work and the size of services during 1968-2009, both in the aggregate
U.S economy and within states.. Section 3 develops a model for a three-sector economy and shows
predictions of uneven productivity growth for the gender wage ratio and market hours for each
gender. Section 4 proposes a calibration of the main model parameters, and Section 5 illustrated
the quantitative predictions of uneven productivity growth for the main variables of interest.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and stylized facts
We show evidence on the evolution of labor market trends by gender and the service share using
micro data from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS) for survey years 1968 to 2009.
This is the data source that o¤ers the longest span on both labor market participation of various
demographic groups and the industry structure. We complement the CPS with data from time
use surveys in order to obtain information on hours of home production.
Our working sample obtained from the CPS includes individuals ages 18-65 (both inclusive),
who are not in full-time education, retired, or military. Data on annual market hours is obtained
from information on usual weekly hours and the number of weeks worked in the year prior to the
survey year. Until 1975, weeks worked in the previous year are only reported in intervals (0, 1-13,
14-26, 26-39, 40-47, 48-49, 50-52), and to recode weeks worked during 1968-1975, we use within
interval means obtained from later surveys. Similarly, usual weekly hours in the previous year are
not available for 1968-1975, and thus we use hours worked during the survey week as a proxy for
usual weekly hours in the previous year. For individuals who did not work during the survey week
we imputed usual weekly hours using the average of current hours for individuals of the same sex
in the same year. Both adjustment methods have been previously applied to the March CPS by
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Katz and Murphy (1992). Our wage concept is represented by hourly earnings, obtained as wage
and salary income in the previous year, divided by annual hours.
Figure 1 shows a number of interesting stylized facts about market work. Panel A plots
usual weekly hours by gender, obtained as averages across the whole population, including the
nonemployed. Female weekly hours rise steadily from about 16 hours in 1968 to 25 hours in 2000,
followed by a slight decline, while male hours were gradually declining throughout the sample
period, from about 40 hours in 1968 to 30 hours in 2009. These diverging trend imply a near
doubling of the hours ratio5 from about 0.43 in 1968 to 0.84 in 2009, and a relatively stable
average number of hours across genders.
To provide very simple evidence on structural transformation we classify hours of work into
two broad sectors, which we dene as goods and services. The goods sector includes the primary
sector; manufacturing; construction and utilities. The service sector includes all the rest and
namely transportation; post and telecommunications; wholesale trade; retail trade; nance, insur-
ance and real estate; professional, business, repair and personal services; entertainment; health;
education; welfare and non-prot organizations; public administration. Panel B in Figure 1 plots
the proportion of hours in services overall and by gender, and shows an increase of nearly 20
percentage points in the share of market hours spent by both males and females in the service
sector. For women such share was always substantially higher than for men, and rose from 74% to
91%, while for men it rose from 50% to 68%. Panel C further shows that all of the (net) increase
in female hours took place in the service sector, while Panel D shows that all of the (net) fall
in male hours took place in the goods sector. In summary, while women were moving (in net
terms) from nonemployment into the service sector, men were moving from the goods sector to
nonemployment.
Figure 2 (Panel A) shows the evolution of the wage ratio in the aggregate economy, obtained
as the exponential of the gap in mean log wages, unadjusted for characteristics. Womens hourly
wages remained relatively stable at or below 65% of male wages until about 1980, and then started
rising up to about 80% in 2009. The combined increase in female hours and wages raised the female
wage bill from 30% to two thirds of the male wage bill. When using hourly wages adjusted for
human capital (age and age squared, race and four education groups), the rise in the gender wage
ratio is only slightly attenuated, from 64% in 1968 to 77% in 2009 (see Panel B). Note nally that
both the gender wage ratio and its trends are quite similar across market sectors.
One very simple way to summarize the relationship between female work and structural trans-
formation consists in showing how much of the rise in the female share in total hours took place
through the expansion of the service sector. We thus decompose the change in the female hours
share between 1968 and 2009 into a term reecting the change in the share of services, and a term
reecting changes in gender intensities within either sector. Having denoted by Lm and Lf the
annual hours worked by men and women, respectively, and by L their sum, the change in the
5Throughout the paper, hours and wage ratios indicate female values divided by male values.
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Table 1: A Decomposition of Female Hours Share into Within- and Between-Sector Components
change (100) % between sectors
1968-2009 42:2  27:5 = 14:7 46:8
1968-1980 34:3  27:5 = 6:8 29:8
1980-1990 38:8  34:3 = 4:4 38:2
1990-2000 40:2  38:8 = 1:4 64:7
2000-2009 42:2  40:2 = 2:0 104:7
Notes. The rst column reports changes in the female hours share as on the left-hand side of equation
1. The second column reportes the ratio between the rst term on the right-hand side of equation 1 and
the left-hand side.
female hours share between time 0 and time t can be expressed as
Lft
Lt
  Lf0
L0
=
X
j
fj

Ljt
Lt
  Lj0
L0

+
X
j
j

Lfjt
Ljt
  Lfj0
Lj0

; (1)
where j indexes sectors, Lfjt denotes female hours in sector j at time t, Ljt = Lmjt+Lfjt denotes
the sectoral hours, and nally fj =

Lfjt
Ljt
+
Lfj0
Lj0

=2 and j =

Ljt
Lt
+
Lj0
L0

=2 are decomposition
weights. The rst term in equation (1) represents the change in the female hours share that is
attributable to structural transformation, while the second term reects changes in the female
intensity within sector. The fj and j terms serve as weights on the between- and within
industry components, respectively, obtained as averages over the sample period. The results of
this decomposition are reported in Table 1, both for the whole sample period and for each decade
separately. The rst column reports the total change in the female hours share, while the second
column reports the proportion of this change that took place between-sectors. The female hours
share increased from 27.5% in 1968 to 42.2% in 2009, and nearly one half of this increase took
place between sectors, i.e. through the expansion of services. Looking across decades, one can
notice a marked deceleration in the rise of the female hours share and an important increase in its
between industry component.
While the above decomposition highlights the importance of the sectoral dimension in the
aggregate evolution of market hours by gender, below we investigate the association between the
rise in services and gender-specic outcomes across US states. To do this we regress (log) hours
per person by state and gender on the state-level share of services, controlling for both state and
time e¤ects:
Lgst
Pgst
= 0 + 1

Lst_serv
Lst

+ fg + 2

fg 
Lst_serv
Lst

+ s + t + "gst (2)
where Lgst denotes annual hours worked by gender g = m; f in state s and year t; Pgst is the
corresponding population, Lst_serv
Lst
is the share of services in state level hours, fg is a female
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dummy, and s and t represent state and year xed-e¤ects, respectively. While 1 represents the
total e¤ect of services on average hours per person, 2 picks di¤erences in this e¤ect by gender.
A similar expression can be estimated for individual wages:
lnwist = 0 +X
0
ist + 1

Lst_serv
Lst

+ fi + 2

fi 
Lst_serv
Lst

+ s + t + "ist (3)
where wist denotes the hourly wage of individual i in state s at time t, Xist is a vector of human
capital characteristics including three education dummies, age and its square and a nonwhite
dummy, fi is a female dummy and s and t represent state and year xed-e¤ects, respectively.
The regression results for specications (2) and (3) are reported in Table 2. The sample period
is now restricted to 1977-2009, which is the longest span over which a consistent classication
for state of residence is available in the CPS. Figures reported in column (1) imply that, when
the service share rises by 10 percentage points in a state, annual hours decline on average by 112
hours for men, but rise by nearly 50 hours for women (161:2  112), and both e¤ects are strongly
signicant. Moreover, column 2 shows that a 10 percentage point rise in the service share implies
a fall in male wages of 6%, but a rise in female wages of nearly 3% (0:0886 0:0599). These e¤ects
are robust to the introduction of individual controls for the sector of employment, interacted with
gender (column 3).
In summary, both the between- and within-sector decomposition of the female hours share and
the cross-state regressions for hours and wages clearly indicate that a rise in the service sector
signicantly improves the labor market prospects of women relative to men.
A further stylized to emphasize here is the change in the distribution of total work between
market and home production for each gender. Information on this is gathered from time use data,
by linking major US surveys: 1965-1966 Americas Use of Time; 1975-1976 Time Use in Economics
and Social Accounts; 1985 AmericansUse of Time; 1992-1994 National Human Activity Pattern
Survey; and the 2003-2009 American Time Use Surveys. These surveys are described in detail in
Aguiar and Hurst (2007). As a measure of labor supply to the labor market we use coremarket
work (in the denition of Aguiar and Hurst, 2007), including time worked on main jobs, second
jobs and overtime, but excluding time spent commuting to/from work and time spent on ancillary
activities (like meal time or breaks at work). This is the labor supply measure that is most closely
comparable to market hours measured in the CPS, although one remaining di¤erence is that usual
hours are reported in the CPS but actual hours are reported in the times use surveys. To obtain
a measure of home production we add hours spent on core household chores (cleaning, preparing
meals, shopping, repairing etc.) and hours of child care.
Figure 3 shows trends in market and home hours for men and women since 1965. The series for
market work of men and women clearly converge during the sample period: weekly hours worked
in the market rise from 19 to 23 per week for women, and fall from 42 to 33 for men. The trends
are very similar to those detected using the CPS in Figure 1A, although levels are slightly higher
in time use data than in the CPS. The series for home production also converge across genders,
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Table 2: The Impact of the Service Share on Hours Per Person and Wages by Gender
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3)
hours per person log wages log wages
female  1700
(87)
 0:921
(0:061)
 0:851
(0:058)
service share  1120
(124)
 0:599
(0:105)
 0:454
(0:104)
service share * female 1612
(121)
0:886
(0:088)
0:801
(0:081)
work in services _ _  0:143
(0:008)
work in services * female _ _ 0:027
(0:006)
human capital controls yes yes yes
state dummies yes yes yes
year dummies yes yes yes
no. observations 3,366 2,003,052 2,003,052
R2 0.929 0.316 0.320
Notes. Human capital controls include three education dummies (college degree, some college education,
high school completed - the excluded category is high school dropout), age and its square, and a non-white
dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Sample: 1977-2009.
and in particular household hours fall from 38 to 28 per week for women, and rise from 11 to 16 for
men. Interestingly, there are no major gender di¤erences in total hours of work (see also Burda,
Hamermesh, Weil, 2013), but of course the market/home divide of total work di¤ers sharply across
genders. For women the share of market work in total work rises from one third in 1965 to 45%
in 2009, while for men this falls from 80% to two thirds.
3 The Model
Our proposed model shows how the processes of structural transformation and marketization can
account for the rise in the wage ratio, the rise in female market hours and the fall in male market
hours. To highlight the role of each process we develop the model in three steps. First, we
introduce structural transformation in a simple two-sector model (goods and services), without
home production, and show that structural transformation raises the wage ratio wage when women
have a comparative advantage in the service sector. Second, we introduce a home sector producing
services that are close substitutes to market services, and illustrate that marketization of home
production and structural transformation jointly imply a rise in the wage ratio and in the share of
market hours for women, relative to men. To keep these steps simple, we derive results from the
planners optimal resource allocation across sectors. Finally, we lay down the full model economy
in decentralized equilibrium, in order to quantitatively access the role of structural transformation
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and marketization in labor market trends.6
3.1 The Role of Structural Transformation
We rst consider a simple economy with two sectors, producing goods and services respectively,
that are poor substitutes in consumption. The assumed utility function is a CES specication
dened over goods (c1) and services (c2), with an elasticity of substitution " < 1 :
U (c1; c2) 
h
!c
" 1
"
1 + (1  !) c
" 1
"
2
i "
" 1
: (4)
Production in each sector j = 1; 2 is given by the following linear technology
cj = AjLj (5)
where productivity growth j 
_Aj
Aj
is faster in the goods sector, 1 > 2: Similarly as in Ngai and
Pissarides (2007), uneven productivity growth and poor substitutability across sectoral outputs
imply structural transformation, by shifting resources from the goods to service sector.
We next introduce a gender dimension in production by modelling the labor input in each
sector, Lj, as a CES aggregator of female and male work:
Lj =

jL
 1

fj +
 
1  j

L
 1

mj
 
 1
j = 1; 2; (6)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between male and female inputs, and 1 < 2 is imposed
to capture womens comparative advantage in producing services. The model is closed with the
corresponding resource constraints for each gender:
Lg1 + Lg2 = Lg g = f;m: (7)
We obtain the equilibrium allocation in this economy solving for the wage ratio x  wf
wm
and
the share of female hours in the goods sector, Lf1
Lf
: We describe the key steps below and leave the
details to the Appendix.
First, free mobility of inputs across sectors implies equal marginal rates of technical transfor-
mation (MRTS),
j
1  j

Lmj
Lfj
1=
= x; j = 1; 2: (8)
Combining equations (7) and (8) for j = 1; 2 gives the following allocation of female hours:
Lf1
Lf
= T (x) 
x  Lm
Lf
  a2
a1   a2
; (9)
6To keep exposition as simple as possible, we abstract from capital in production. This implies that our model
is essentially static and time subscripts may be everywhere omitted.
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where aj  1 jj ; j = 1; 2, and a1 > a2 due to 1 < 2:
Free mobility of female labor across sectors also implies equalization of the marginal revenue
product of labor. Given the equalization of MRTS in (8), we can derive the allocation of female
input across the two sectors as a function of the relative wage
Lf1
Lf2
= R (x) 

!
1  !
"
A2
A1
1 "
1
2
"
z2 (x)
z1 (x)
1 "=
; (10)
where
zj (x)  Lj
Lfj
= 

 1
j
 
1 + ajx
 1  1 ; j = 1; 2: (11)
Together with the resource constraint for female hours, (10) implies
Lf1
Lf
= D (x)  R (x)
1 +R (x)
: (12)
Equilibrium condition (9) is derived independent of the demand, and hence of parameters of
the utility function ! and ": It describes the optimal cross-sector input allocation, given sector-
specic technology, and it implies that the equilibrium wage ratio is within the range (x1; x2),
where xj  1aj

Lm
Lf
1=
is the equilibrium wage ratio in a one-sector economy with sector j only.
Equilibrium condition (12) describes optimal output allocation in addition to optimal input alloca-
tion. Equations (9) and (12) solve for equilibrium Lf1
Lf
and x: The other three equilibrium variables
(Lm1; Lm2; Lf2) are derived using condition (8) and the resources constraint (7) for j = 1; 2.
The equilibrium can be summarized in the

x;
Lf1
Lf

space, where equilibrium

x;
Lf1
Lf

is the
intersection of relationships (9) and (12), see Figure 4. While (9) is downward sloping, the slope
of (12) depends on "=: Given a1 > a2; we show in the Appendix that (12) is upward sloping for
 6 ", or downward sloping for  > ", but atter than (9), i.e. D0 (x) > T 0 (x). Thus we establish
that equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 1 When goods and services are poor substitutes (" < 1), faster productivity growth
in the goods sector triggers structural transformation, which in turn shifts hours of work from
the production of goods to production of services. When women have a comparative advantage in
producing services, this raises the wage ratio.
The proof for Proposition 1 is as follows. From (10), a rise in A1
A2
leads to a fall in R (x) ; which
shifts down the D(x) curve (12), tracing equilibrium downward along the T (x) curve (9), resulting
in higher x and lower Lf1
Lf
: This result has two components. The rst component is similar to the
nding of Ngai and Pissarides (2007) that, under poor substitutability between goods and services,
faster productivity growth in the goods sector shifts resources from the goods sector to the service
sector. The second component is novel: since women have a comparative advantage in the service
sector, the process of structural transformation acts as an increase in relative demand for female
labor, which in turn raises the wage ratio. Note that while the sign of the impact of structural
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transformation on the wage ratio is independent of the elasticity of substitution between inputs ,
its magnitude does indeed depend on : Finally, it is easily shown that an increase in the relative
supply of female hours leads to a fall in the wage ratio as higher Lf=Lm shifts down the T (x)
curve (9), resulting in lower x:
The result in Proposition 1 is related to the recent analysis by Heathcote et al (2010), which
illustrates in a one-sector model that an exogenous gender-biased shift in labor demand can explain
the whole rise in the wage ratio in the US in recent decades, and the bulk of the rise in hours ratio.
Using a two-sector model, Proposition 1 shows that structural transformation in the presence of
gender comparative advantages can endogenously rationalize such gender-biased demand shifts.
To explicitly see the link between our approach and that of Heathcote et al (2010), consider a
one-sector model with a CES aggregate production function as in (6), with a technology parameter
. The equilibrium wage ratio in such economy is given by
wf
wm
=

1  

Lm
Lf
1=
: (13)
Note that this wage ratio falls within the (x1; x2) range dened above if  falls within the (1; 2)
range. In other words, the equilibrium wage ratio in a two-sector model is related to the equilibrium
ratio in a one-sector model by equation (13), with  = 1+(1  ) 2, where weights  and 1 
are the shares of female hours in sectors 1 and 2, respectively. The advantage of explicitly deriving
equilibrium in the two-sector model is that the implied aggregate  evolves endogenously with the
industry structure. That is, structural transformation raises the implied  and the wage ratio,
whereas in a one-sector model  can only rise exogenously.
In the next subsection we endogenize total market hours for both genders. This has conse-
quences for the full impact of structural transformation on the wage ratio when  <1, and helps
rationalize changes in female and male market hours. Specically, allowing  < 1 implies that
if structural transformation were to encourage female labor supply, its e¤ect on the wage ratio
would be dampened via this general equilibrium channel.7
3.2 Structural Transformation and Marketization
This subsection introduces a home sector into the previous two-sector model, in order to account
for changes in the allocation of time between the market and the household. Time spent o¤ the
market may include both leisure, which directly a¤ects individualsutility, and home production,
which a¤ects utility through services produced in the home. While changes in market hours may in
principle imply changes in total working time (via changes in leisure) or changes in the distribution
of total working time between the market and the home at constant leisure, time use data reveal
that total working time was remarkably similar across genders throughout our sample period. The
7Healthcote et al (2010) assume that male and female inputs are perfect substitute ( !1); so the increase in
wage ratio is equal to the exogenous ratio = (1  ) :
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ratio between female and male total hours is 1.08 in 1965 and it very slightly declines to 1.03 in
2009. On the other hand, the evolution of fraction of market hours in total hours di¤ers markedly
across genders, rising from 0.34 to 0.45 for women and falling from 0.79 to 0.67 for men. We
therefore abstract from leisure decisions and focus on the allocation of total work between the
market and the home.
As above, individuals consume two commodities, goods (c1) and services (c2), and the utility
function is as in (4). The main new addition here is that services may be produced both in the
market and at home, and market and home services are good substitutes, with  > 1 denoting
the elasticity of substitution between them:
c2 =
h
 c
 1

s + (1   ) c
 1

h
i 
 1
; (14)
where s indexes market-produced services and h indexes home-produced services. Market and
home services are produced with identical technologies, except for the productivity index Aj :
cj = yj = Aj

2L
 1

fj + (1  2)L
 1

mj
 
 1
j = s; h; (15)
where we assume the productivity growth in the market is at least as fast as in the home: s > h.
Finally in addition to (7), there is a labor allocation constraint within services:
Lgs + Lgh = Lg2 g = f;m: (16)
In the simple two-sector model, Lg denotes both total working hours for gender g and labor supply
to the market, and it is exogenously set. Once we introduce home production, Lg still denotes
total working hours and is xed, but labor supply to the market is now given by (Lg1 + Lgs) and
is endogenous.
Below we solve this extended model in two steps. We rst solve for the optimal allocation
between market and home of a given amount of labour (Lf2; Lm2) engaged in producing services,
and next solve for the optimal allocation of labor across the production of goods and services. The
optimal labor allocation between market and home services can be obtained by maximizing (14)
with respect to (Lfs; Lms; Lfh; Lmh), subject to the resources constraints in (16). Free mobility of
inputs between market and home implies equalization of marginal rate of technical transformation.
As the respective production functions are identical except for the productivity indexes, this implies
Lfs
Lms
=
Lfh
Lmh
=
Lf2
Lm2
; (17)
where resource constraints (16) are used to derive the second equality.
Free mobility of female labor between the home and the market implies equalization of the
value of marginal product of labor in home- and market-produced services. Using the results from
the two-sector model with a new notation Rmh, the equivalent of equation (10) is
Lfs
Lfh
= Rmh 

 
1   
 
As
Ah
 1
: (18)
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This describes the process of marketization: given market and home services are good substitutes
with  > 1; faster productivity growth in the market service sectors shifts hours from home to the
market. A similar implication can be worked out for men.
To derive the allocation between the production of goods and services, we need to obtain a
hypothetical production function for the composite services c2: We show in the Appendix that
this is equivalent to (5)-(6) for the two-sector model, with the qualication that the productivity
index A2 depends on As and Ah according to:
A2 =  

 1As

Rmh
1 +Rmh
  1
 1
; (19)
and its growth is given by a weighted average of productivity growth in market and home services,
with weights given by the share of labor in each sector:
2 =

Rmh
1 +Rmh

s +

1
1 +Rmh

h; (20)
It is important to note that productivity growth in composite services (2) is now endogenously
determined by the process of marketization.
As one can aggregate market- and home-produced services into a composite service output
c2; , the equilibrium solution

x;
Lf1
Lf

in the extended model still satises (9) and (12), with
A2 dened by (19). Given 1 > (s; h); (20) implies 1 > 2 and thus Proposition 1 holds in
the extended model. More specically, Proposition 1 builds on the fact that faster productivity
growth in the goods sector decreases the R (x) relationship in (10), which in turn shifts down the
equilibrium condition (12) and leads to an increase in the wage ratio. It is important to note that
Proposition 1 solely relies on (1  ") (1   2) > 0 and thus it is independent of the marketization
process as long as productivity growth is highest in the goods sector.
The actual magnitude of the change in the wage ratio depends on both structural transforma-
tion and marketization. To see this, lets dene
MT  (s   h) (   1) > 0; ST  (1  ") (1   s) > 0; (21)
where the former denotes the intensity of marketization as discussed in (18) and the latter denotes
the intensity of structural transformation across market sectors. Both are a combination of exoge-
nous parameters, and their e¤ects on wages and hours work via the downward shift in R (x) and
the shift in Rmh. More precisely, let
4R(x)
R(x)
and 4Rmh
Rmh
denote shifts in R (x) and Rmh; respectively,
due to di¤erences in productivity growth. Using (18) one obtains:
4Rmh
Rmh
=MT; (22)
and using (10) and (20) one obtains:
 4R (x)
R(x)
= (1  ") (1   2) = ST + (1  ")

s   h
1 +Rmh

; (23)
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which depends on both ST and MT in a non-trivial way. Proposition 1 states that the intensity
of the wage ratio e¤ects depends positively on  4R(x)
R(x)
: Equation (23) in turn implies that  4R(x)
R(x)
,
depends on four factors. First, it rises with the intensity of structural transformation through
lower " or higher (1   s). Second, it falls with , due to the positive e¤ect of  onMT and thus
the rise in Rmh: Third, it may either rise or fall with (s   h), as (s   h) has a direct (positive)
e¤ect on  4R(x)
R(x)
and an indirect (negative) e¤ect through MT and Rmh.
We next turn to the models prediction for market hours worked by each gender. Let g 
1  Lgh
Lg
denote the fraction of market hours out of total working hours for each gender. Using (10)
and (18), for women this ratio is given by
f  1 
Lfh
Lf
= 1 

1
1 +R (x)

1
1 +Rmh

: (24)
Using the hours ratios obtained in (8) and (17), and the denitions of f and m we obtain
1  m
1  f
=
Lf
Lm
(a2x)
 =
R (x) + 1
a1
a2

R (x) + 1
; (25)
where the second equality follows from the equilibrium conditions (9) and (12). The rst equality
describes the substitution e¤ect between male and female hours in home production, whereby a
higher wage ratio discourages relative female hours in home production. The second equality links
this e¤ect to the role of structural transformation and marketization. Specically, if women have a
comparative advantage in producing services (a1 > a2), the rise in
1 m
1 f results from falling R (x),
in turn induced by structural transformation and marketization (see equation (23)).
The fraction of male hours spent in the market can be derived by combining (24) and (25):
m = 1 
0@ 1
a1
a2

R (x) + 1
1A 1
1 +Rmh

: (26)
It follows from (24) and (26) that falling R (x) shifts hours of work from the market to the
household for both genders, whereas rising Rmh shifts hours of work from the household to the
market. We can now summarize the e¤ects of structural transformation and marketization as
follows:
Proposition 2 For both genders, market hours as a fraction of total working time
 
f ; m

fall
with structural transformation but rise with marketization.
While structural transformation and marketization are dened as gender-neutral by (21),
womens comparative advantage in services turn them de facto into gender-biased forces, as im-
plied by (24) and (26): In particular, a1 > a2 implies that the rise in Rmh has a stronger e¤ect
on f than m, while the fall in R (x) has a stronger e¤ect on m than f : Thus both structural
transformation and marketization imply a rise in f=m:
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Proposition 3 Given womens comparative advantage in services, both the process of structural
transformation and the process of marketization lead to a rise in womens market hours as a
fraction of total working, relative to men, f=m.
We nally derive the service share in market hours, s, in Appendix as
s =
"
1 +

As
A1
1 "
1 +Rmh
Rmh
 "
 1
G (x)
# 1
; (27)
where
G (x) =

!
1  !
"
1
2
 (1 ")
 1

1 + a2x
 1
1 + a1x
 1
  "
 1

1 + a1x

1 + a2x


: (28)
Note rst that, conditional on x; the service share (27) rises with both structural transformation
and marketization, similarly as in Ngai and Pissarides (2008). In our model there are two further,
opposing e¤ects via equilibrium x, represented by the last two terms in equation (28):8 As it will be
illustrated in the Quantitative section, the overall e¤ect of these two equilibrium e¤ect is minimal
compared to the direct e¤ect from ST and MT:
Proposition 4 The rise in service hours share rises with both structural transformation and
marketization.
To summarize, we have shown in this subsection that structural transformation and marke-
tization raise the wage ratio and the fraction of market hours in total working time for women
relative to men in Propositions (1) and (3), respectively. As evidence shows that the change in
total working hours is similar across genders (see also the iso-work results established by Burda,
Hamermesh and Weil, 2013), Proposition 3 also implies a rise in womens market hours relative
to men. Proposition 4 establishes that the model predicts a rise in the service employment share.
Together, these results are consistent with estimates from cross-state regressions reported in Table
(2), that the rise in services is highly correlated with narrowing gender gaps in wages and hours.
Proposition 2 shows that a combination of structural transformation and marketization can po-
tentially account for the rise in the wage ratio, the rise in female market hours (especially in the
service sector) and the fall in male market hours (especially in the goods sector).
3.3 The Baseline model
Having described the qualitative impact of structural transformation and marketization on wages
and hours by gender, our objective here is to embody these processes into a framework that can
8Given a1 > a2; the rising wage ratio raises the relative cost of female hours, which has a detrimental impact
on service share. This works through the term

1+a1x

1+a2x


in (28). On the other hand, rising x induces more women
to move from the goods to the service sector where they have comparative advantage, thus raising s through the
term

1+a2x
 1
1+a1x
 1
  "
 1
in (28):
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be calibrated to the U.S. economy. To do this, we apply one small modication to the model
presented in the previous subsection, i.e. we allow womens comparative advantage in services
to di¤er between the household and the market.9 In particular the production function (15) is
replaced by
cj = Aj

jL
 1

fj +
 
1  j

L
 1

mj
 
 1
; j = s; h: (29)
This generalization implies that the aggregation across market and home services is not as simple.
However, the generalization does not alter the qualitative results summarized in Propositions 1-6.
To gain intuition it is useful to derive the decentralized equilibrium of the model. In doing this
we will focus on comparing the changes resulting from the generalization in (29).
3.3.1 Firms and Households
Both market sectors are perfectly competitive. Taking wages (wf ; wm) and prices (p1; ps) as given,
rms in sector j = 1; s choose (Lmj; Lfj) to maximize prots, subject to technologies (5) and (6).
Prot maximization implies:
wf = pjAjj

Lj
Lfj
1=
; wm = pjAj
 
1  j
 Lj
Lmj
1=
; j = 1; s: (30)
Within each sector the marginal rate of technical substitution between female and male labor
equals the wage ratio, thus condition (8) is satised under free labor mobility.
Each household consists of a male and a female who jointly maximize a utility function in goods
and services as in (4), where c2 is dened by (14) and can be purchased in the market or produced at
home using technology (15). Given wages (wf ; wm) and prices (p1; ps), a representative household
chooses a consumption vector (c1; c2) and home production vector (Lmh; Lfh) ; and supply the rest
of their working time to the market. Specically, the household maximizes the utility function
(4), subject to (14), (29) and the household budget constraint:
p1c1 + p2c2 = wm (Lm   Lmh) + wf (Lf   Lfh) : (31)
Utility maximization implies that the marginal rate of technical substitution across Lmh and
Lfh equals the wage ratio as in (8); and the marginal rate of substitution across goods and services
equal to their relative price. We next dene the implicit price of home production similarly as for
market production in (30): ph  wg
Ah
@Lh
@Lgh
; which implies that equation (11) holds for j = h as well.
Using the utility function (14) the relative demand of market to home services is
cs
ch
=

ph
ps
 
 
1   

; (32)
9As will be become clearer in the Quantitative section, U.S. data suggests h is close to s but slightly bigger.
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and the corresponding relative expenditure is given by
Es;h  pscs
phch
=

ph
ps
 1
 
1   

; (33)
stating that, if market and home services are good substitutes ( > 1) ; a fall in the price of market
services relative to home services will induce households to buy more market service relative to
home services. This is the process of marketization.
Using the utility function (4) and (14), the relative demand of goods relative to market services
is
c1
cs
=

!
1  !
ps
p1
"
 
 "
 1
"
1 +

1   
 

ch
cs
 1

# "
 1
: (34)
and the relative expenditure is:
E1;s =

p1
ps
1 "
!
1  !
"
 
 "
 1
"
1 +

1   
 
 
ps
ph
 1# " 1
: (35)
There are two potential sources for the decline in E1;s: The rst one is marketization, through
the fall in relative prices ps
ph
: The second is structural transformation: as goods and services are
poor substitutes (" < 1) ; a fall in p1
ps
induces households to spend less on goods relative to market
services.
Finally, we derive female home production hours (Lfh) and market hours (Lf Lfh) by rewriting
the budget constraint (31):
Lmwm + wfLf =
X
j=1;s;h
pjcj = phch
X
j=1;s;h
Ej;h: (36)
Rearranging, we obtain:
Lfh
Lf
=
Ih (x)
I (x)
X
j=1;s;h
Ej;h
; (37)
where
Ij (x)  wfLfj
pjyj
= j [zj (x)]
1= 1 (38)
is the female wage bill share in sector j and
I (x)  wfLf
wfLf + wmLm
=
1
1 + Lm
xLf
(39)
is the female wage bill share in total work. The fraction of female working time supplied to the
market is f = 1   LfhLf , which is a function of the wage ratio and relative prices because the
relative expenditure is a function of relative prices see eqn 35. Intuitively, equation (37) states
that when the expenditure for either market commodity rises relative to home production (i.e. E1;h
and Es;h rise), and/or when the female wage bill share in the market more than in the household
(Ih (x) =I (x) falls), women shift their working time from the household to the market.
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3.3.2 Market Equilibrium
Given the optimal rm and household decisions, we use market clearing to determine relative
prices and the wage ratio. Using (30), we can derive relative prices as function of the wage ratio:
pk
pj
=
Ajj
Akk

zj (x)
zk (x)
1=
; j; k = 1; s; h: (40)
Give relative expenditures in (33) and (35), womens time allocation can be derived from produc-
tion functions (5) and (29),
Lfi
Lfj
=
(Lj=Lfj)
(Li=Lfi)
Ajci
Aicj
; i; j = 1; s; h: (41)
Using (11) and (40), condition (41) can be rewritten as
Lfi
Lfj
= Ei;j
i
j

zi (x)
zj (x)
1= 1
= Ei;j
Ii (x)
Ij (x)
; i; j = 1; s; h: (42)
which is an intuitive condition. That is, female relative time allocation to a sector is determined
by the between-sector alloction of expenditure (Ei;j) and the within sector distribution of the
wage bill across genders. By substituting (42) into the female time constraint (16), the demand
for female home production time is
Lfh
Lf
=
1X
j=1;s;h
Ej;h
Ij(x)
Ih(x)
: (43)
We can now solve for the equilibrium gender wage ratio x by equating demand (43) and supply
(37), i.e.
I (x)
X
j=1;s;h
Ej;h  
X
j=1;s;h
Ij (x)Ej;h = 0: (44)
Thus the gender wage ratio x, and as a result, female labour supply f = 1  LfhLf ; depend on both
structural transformation and marketization. Changes that are gender-neutral such as shocks to
sector-specic productivity Aj can trigger marketization and structural transformation, which in
turn a¤ect female market hours f and the relative wage x: More explicitly, from the expressions
for relative prices (40) and relative expenditures (33) and (35), equilibrium
 
x; f

depends on
marketization and structural transformation as dened in (21). This completes the derivation for
the decentralized equilibrium. It is important to point out that Propositions 1-4 hold in this more
general model for s close to h.
10
10The main change is the presence of additional equilibrium e¤ect via the wage ratio x, as the hours ratio in the
home sector is a function of x in sccording to (8).
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Table 3: Data Targets
CPS data ATUS data
year wf
wm
s sf sm f m
f
m
1968-72 0.64 0.58 0.75 0.51 0.36 0.78 0.46
2005-09 0.77 0.75 0.88 0.65 0.46 0.68 0.67
With time use data, the beginning-of-period gure is the average of values recorded in 1965 and 1975.
4 Quantitative Results
Below we quantitatively assess the importance of structural transformation and marketization in
accounting for the rise in the wage ratio and female market hours relative to male. We now explain
how the models variables are related to the data and how we calibrate the model.
4.1 Data Targets
Data on the wage ratio are obtained from the CPS, 1968-2009. For each year in the CPS we rst
regress log wages on a female dummy, age and its square, three education dummies and a nonwhite
dummy. We then obtain the wage ratio adjusted for human capital as (the exponential of) the
coe¢ cient on the female dummy in wage regressions. Data on the allocation of hours across goods
and services within the market are obtained using information on total annual market hours by
sector and gender from the CPS, while data on the allocation of hours across the household and
the market are obtained from information on usual weekly hours from the ATUS, 1965-2009.
To smooth out short run uctuations and possibly single-year outliers that are not relevant for
model predictions, we use take a ve-year average at the beginning and at the end of our sample
period, respectively, as targets for our model. All data targets used are summarized in Table 4.
4.2 Calibration
As shown in the model, the intensities of structural transformation and marketization are dened
as ST  (1  ") (1   s) and MT  (   1) (s   h), respectively. While the productivity
di¤erential 1   s is directly measurable, the other three parameters are less straightforward to
pin down. Existing work suggests an elasticity of substitution between market goods and services
on one side and home production on the other side in the range of 1.5 to 2.3 (see Rupert et al.,
1995; McGrattan et al., 1997, and Chang and Schorfheide, 2003). As  denotes the elasticity
of substitution between market services and home production, it should be as least as large as
the elasticity of substitution between any market good and home production. Thus we use the
upper bound of existing estimates  = 2:3 as a benchmark. Ngai and Pissarides (2008) review
previous work on the elasticity of substitution between goods and services and suggest (0; 0:3) as
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a plausible range for ". Relatively low values for " are also consistent with the recent ndings
in Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2013) on newly-constructed consumption value-added
data. Herrendorf, Rogerson and Valentinyi (2013) argue that if the sectoral production functions
are value-added production functions, as it is the case in our model, the arguments of the utility
function should be the value added components of nal consumption - as opposed to consumption
expenditures. Using input-output tables to construct a time-series for consumption value-added,
they obtain an estimate for " of 0.002,11 which we use as our benchmark value. As regards
productivity growth, note that j in our model does not coincide with labor productivity growth,
as labor productivity is measured based on total hours worked by both genders combined, while Aj
denotes productivity of the composite labor input Lj, as dened in equation (6). In the Appendix
we illustrate the mapping of actual labor productivity growth into j using data on gender intensity
from the CPS. The implied di¤erence in growth rates is 1   s = 1:2%: Turning to productivity
growth in the home sector, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has recently re-caculated U.S.
household production using national accounting conventions (see report by Bridgman et al 2012
and references therein). The basic idea consists in estimating value added by imputing income
to labor and capital used in home production. Based on this procedure, Bridgman (2013) nds
that the average labour productivity growth in home production is 0.5%. During the same period,
BEA data reveals that the average labour productivity growth for the service sector is 1.2%, and
thus we set s   h = 0:7% as our benchmark. We perform sensitivity analysis on (; "; s   h)
in Section 5.4.
The four parameters , ", 1 s and s h help measure directly the intensities of structural
transformation and marketization. Given such intensities, the models predictions for the change
in working hours and the wage ratio depends on the gender-related parameters, and namely the
time series for the hours ratio Lft
Lmt
, the elasticity of substitution  and the technology parameters
(1; s; h) :
Changes in Lft
Lmt
can be driven by both changes in the gender mix in the population and changes
in the gender-specic time allocation between work (market and home) and other activities (leisure,
sleep and personal care). Our model is silent about either force, and our strategy is to pick the
growth rate in Lft
Lmt
that matches their combined change. During 1968-2009, the population ratio
decreased from 1.15 to 1.086 in the CPS, while the hours ratio rose from 1.046 (1965 data) to
1.025 in time use surveys. Together these gures imply that the hours ratio is falling at a rate of
0.18% per year.
As for the elasticity of substitution between male and female labour inputs, , we draw on both
existing estimates and our own estimates on the CPS. Hamermesh (1993) reports evidence on the
male-female elasticity of substitution of 2 and 2.3 for the UK and Australia, respectively (Layard,
1983; Lewis, 1985). More recently, Weinberg (2000) obtains an estimate for this parameter for the
11They nd that the estimate is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero. Our results are almost identical
for the case of " = 0:002 or " = 0:
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US of 2:4, and Acemoglu, Autor and Lyle (2004) obtain a slightly higher estimate of about 3: We
also attempt to estimate  using CPS data on hours and wages by gender aggregated at the state
level. Our regression equation is
ln
wmst
wfst
= 0 + 1 ln
Lmst
Lfst
+ 2
hmst
hfst
+ s + t + "st; (45)
where wmst and wfst are average wages by gender in state s and year t; Lmst and Lfst are the cor-
responding aggregate hours, hmst and hfst are controls for human capital, and s and t represent
state and time xed-e¤ects, respectively. Human capital indicators are gender-specic vectors of
proportions of college graduates, high-school graduates with some college and high school gradu-
ates, and 2 denotes the vector of associated parameters. Equation (45) is estimated for 1977-2009,
as information on state of residence is only available in a consistent form from 1977 onwards. Cells
in the regression are weighted by each states population and standard errors are clustered at the
state level. The resulting estimate for 1 is  0:241 (s.e. 0.057), implying an elasticity of substitu-
tion just above 4. In what follows we take 3 as our benchmark value for , which roughly coincides
with the average of existing estimates for the US, and we perform some sensitivity analysis in
Section 5.3.
We next describe how we match the six data targets
 
xt ; st ; sft ; smt ; ft ; mt

at any point
in time t. We show in the Appendix that they are matched by six parameters

Lft
Lmt
; 1; s; h; A^1;s; A^s;h

where12
A^s;h 

As
Ah

1   
 
 
1 
; A^1;s 

A1
As

1  !
!
 "
1 "
 
 "
1  "
1 " : (46)
Given the six parameters and the calibrated growth rates, the model delivers predictions for 
xt; st; sft; smt; ft; mt

for any period t. While in most cases one would match data targets at
the start of the sample period and make predictions forward by feeding in the exogenous dynamic
process, we match data targets to the end of the sample period and make predictions backward.
The reason for this choice is that our model abstracts from an important factor identied in the
literature for the rise in the wage ratio, and namely the decline in labor market discrimination
against women (see, among others, Goldin, 2006). It would be thus unreasonable to force our
model to match gender moments for the late 1960s perfectly unless labor market discrimination is
explicitly taken into account, as the implied parameters levels would be far from the true one even
if our model were a good description of the economy except for discrimination. It seems instead
more reasonable for a model without gender discrimination to match gender-specic moments in
the late 2000s.
Specically, we match the wage ratio and time allocation by genders across market and the
household for the average of 2005-2009. We then feed in the productivity growth di¤erentials
to predict the average wage ratio and time allocation during 1968-1972. The exact calibration
12Note that the growth of A^jk are identical as the growth of Ajk; which explains why the calibration of jk is
su¢ cient for the prediction on future levels of A^jk:
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Table 4: Baseline Parameters
Parameters Values Targets
1   s 1.2% labor productivity growth in goods and services, adjusted for gender intensity
s   h 0.7% Bridgman (2013) on home productivity and BEA on service productivity
 2.3 max. estimate for elasticity of subst. between all market goods and home production
" 0.002 elasticity of substitution across goods and services, Herrendorf et. al. (2013)
 3 avg. of our estimates and other estimates on elasticity of subst. across gender

Lf=Lm
-0.18% CPS data on population and time use data on total work across genders
Lft
Lmt
1.19 match s given (sf ; sm; f ; m)
1 0.332 match relative wage x and relative hours ratio
Lf;1;t
Lm;1;t
=

1 sf
1 sm

f
m

Lft
Lmt
s 0.443 match relative wage x and relative hours ratio
Lf;s;t
Lm;s;t
=

sf
sm

f
m

Lft
Lmt
h 0.495 match relative wage x and relative hours ratio
Lf;h;t
Lm;h;t
=

1 f
1 m

Lft
Lmt
A^s;h 1.02 match females time allocation across market and home
Lf;s;t
Lf;2h;t
=
f sf
1 f
A^1;s 10.8 match females time allocation across goods and services
Lf;1;t
Lf;s;t
=
1 sf
sf
procedure for the six level parameters is described in the Appendix. In summary, given the gender
specic time allocation
 
sf ; sm; f ; m

, in order to match the service hours share s we need the
aggregate hours ratio Lft
Lmt
: The implied Lft
Lmt
for the 2005-2009 is 1.19, which is very close to the
number we would obtain on the CPS and time use data directly, 1.12. One would not expect
these two gures to coincide if actual labor market outcomes are a¤ected by potentially important
elements not present in our model, such as discrimination against women or barriers to mobility
across sectors, but the fact that the two gures are very close suggests that a model without
discrimination or mobility barriers does a relatively good job at capturing the hours ratio for
the period 2005-2009. We then set j to match the within-sector hours ratio according to (8).
Finally, together with the allocation of hours across sectors, we pin down

A^s;h; A^s;h

t
. Baseline
parameters are summarized in Table 4
5 Quantitative Results
5.1 Baseline Results
Table 5 reports our baseline results. Using the baseline parameters (row 1), our model perfectly
replicates the rise in services. The service share rises from 0.58 to 0.75 in the data, and the model
replicates this rise almost exactly.13 Using a similar framework without a gender dimension, Ngai
13The percentage explained for any variable xt are computed as

xm o d e l1  xm o d e l0
xd a t a1  xd a t a0

where period 0 is 1968-72 and
period 1 is 2005-2009. Given we matched period 1, xmodel1 = x
data
1 :
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and Pissarides (2008) explain about 73% of the rise in services. As it will become clear in the
Sensitivity Analysis Section 5.4, the improvement here is due to stronger structural transformation
than in Ngai and Pissarides (through lower " than in their calibration) and stronger marketization
(through higher s   h). By introducing a gender dimension, the main value-added of our
framework consists in providing predictions for the wage ratio as well as the separate dynamics of
male and female hours, as illustrated below.
The model replicates quite well time allocation for women but not as well for men. Lets
consider time allocation across market sectors rst. In the data, 75% of womens market hours
and 51% of mens market hours are initially spent in the service sector, rising to 88% and 65%,
respectively by the end of the sample period. The model explains about 87% of the rise in service
hours for women but overpredicts the rise for men. We turn next to allocation between the market
and the home sector. In the data, the average woman allocates 36% of her total working hours
to the market in the late 1960s, rising to 45% by the late 2000s, while for men the corresponding
fraction falls from 78% to 68%. The model explains 44% of the rise for women but only 11% of
the fall in men. In relative term, the model accounts for one third of the observed rise in the ratio
of the market hours share for women, relative to men. Finally, in the data the wage ratio rises
from 0.64 to 0.77, and our model accounts for about one third of this rise.
There are three major driving forces for the change in the share of services, the wage ratio, and
male and female market hours and their ratio. First, there are two demand forces stemming from
structural transformation and marketization in the presence of womens comparative advantages
in producing services, whose e¤ects are summarized in Propositions 1-4. Furthermore, there is
a supply shock, and namely the fall in the total hours ratio Lf=Lm by about 0.18% per year.
To understand the relative contribution of these three forces, we conduct three counter-factual
experiments, muting each force in turn. The results are shown in rows 2-4 of Table 5.
In row 2 we set 1   s = 0, thus shutting down the structural transformation channel, and,
as one would expect, the model now explains a much lower portion of the rise in services, both
overall and for women and men separately (39%, 30% and 59%, respectively). This is in line
with proposition 4. More importantly, the intensity of structural transformation is quantitatively
relevant for the rise in the wage ratio, and in particular it contributes to more than a half of its
predicted increase, conrming Proposition 1. Finally, structural transformation is key to account
for the fall in male market hours as a fraction of total hours, as without it the model would actually
predicts a rise in the male market hours share. The results also conrms the dampening e¤ect
of structural transformation on the rise of female market hours as a share of total hours, as the
models prediction for the female hours share now improves by 20%. These results are in line with
Proposition 2.
In row 3 we set s   h = 0, which is equivalent to shutting down the marketization channel.
This exercise shows that marketization is essential for the rise in female market hours, and a
model without it would in fact predict a fall in female market hours (according to Proposition
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4), as structural transformation alone would move resources from the goods sector to the service
sectors, including the home. Comparing rows 1 and 3 also illustrates the dampening e¤ect of
marketization on the fall of male market hours - consistent with Proposition 2. In its absence the
model can predict only half of the fall in mens market hours.
Finally, comparing rows 2 and 3 with row 1 conrms both Proposition 3 and 4. First, marke-
tization has a stronger e¤ect on female market hours than male market hours, while the opposite
happens for structural transformation - thus they both contribute to the rise in f=m (consistent
with Proposition 3). Quantitatively, marketization contributes about 80 percent of the predicted
rise in f=m whereas ST contributes the remaining 20 percent. Second, both structural trans-
formation and marketization are quantitatively important in accounting for the rise in service
employment share (consistent with Proposition 4), contributing to about 60% and 40% of the
predicted rise, respectively.
Finally, by keeping Lft
Lmt
constant in row 4, it can be shown that slight fall in the gender ratio
of total working time mostly a¤ects the wage ratio, and namely our model can account for 20%
of the rise in the wage ratio absent this labor supply shock. However this does not a¤ect in any
discernible way other model predictions.
5.2 More on gender-biased demand shifts
Our model is novel insofar it allows the wage ratio, female market hours and male market hours
to be endogenously determined by the evolving industry structure. As we discussed in the Model
Section, structural transformation endogenously leads to a gender-biased labor demand shift, which
is modeled as exogenous by Heathcote et al. (2010) and drives the entire rise in the wage ratio and
the bulk of the rise in female market hours in their framework. Specically, Heathcote et al (2010)
consider the case   ! 1 and assume that =(1   ) in (13) grows exogenously so as to match
the observed rise in the wage ratio. This is in turn interpreted as a gender-biased demand shift.
In our multi-sector model we do not assume exogenous changes in js but instead calibrate the 

js
to match the within-sector hours ratios during the late 2000s. The calibrated values are 1 = 0:33
and s = 0:44, reecting womens comparative advantages in services, and the aggregate  in the
economy endogenously rises as labor reallocates from the goods to service sector. Quantitatively,
though, this proposed mechanism is not strong enough to produce a substantial rise in aggregate
; explaining why we fail to explain a large portion of the evolution in gender-specic outcomes 
wf=wm; f ; m; f=m

.
To investigate how much of the gender-biased demand shifts in Heathcote et al (2010) may be
attributed to structural transformation, we allow for exogenous growth in 0js at the same rate as
in Heathcote et al. (2010). In their framework, exogenous growth in =(1  ) needs to match the
observed rise in the wage ratio at 0.5% per year, implying a 0.5% growth rate in =(1  ) when
  ! 1. This shock accounts for three quarters of the increase in relative female hours in their
model.
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In table 6, row 2, we let 1= (1  1) and s= (1  s) grow at 0.5% per year, thereby explaining
the whole rise in female market hours and 82% of the rise in the wage ratio.14 The models
predictions also improve for mens market hours, now accounting for 56% of the observed fall.
Finally the model can accounts for the whole rise in relative female hours. Comparing rows 1
and 2 reveals that structural transformation captures an important part of gender-biased demand
shifts it accounts for about 42% of the predicted increase in the wage ratio (34.4/81.6) and 36%
of the predicted increase in womens relative market hours.
However, there may be other important factors that are observational equivalent to a rise in
(1; s) in the current version of the model, most notably the rise in womens human capital levels
relative to men. This change may be easily incorporated in our model, as the next section will
illustrate.15
5.3 Role of Human capital
To allow for an exogenous rise in womens human capital levels relative to mens we replace raw
(hours) labor inputs by e¢ ciency units of labour hgjLgj, where hgj denotes the e¢ ciency units of
one hour of labor for gender g in sector j: The composite labor expression (6) becomes
Lj =
h
j (hfjLfj)
 1
 +
 
1  j

(hmjLmj)
 1

i 
 1
j = 1; s; h (47)
where the e¢ ciency of human capital is assumed constant across market sectors hg1 = hgs = hg
for each gender g; but may di¤er in the household. As it will become clear later, the quantitative
results are markedly di¤erent whether hgh is lower than or equal to hg. Each gender is paid a wage
wg in the market, which includes the return to their human capital.
The derivation of the extended model follows similar steps as in the baseline model, with two
adjustments. First, equation (11) is now replaced by
Lj
hfjLfj
= zj (x) = 

 1
j
 
1 + bjx
 1  1 j = 1; s; h: (48)
In other words aj is replaced by
bj =

1  j
j

hmj
hfj
  1

= aj

hmj
hfj
  1

j = 1; s; h: (49)
Second, the relatives price between market and home services in (40) is now
pi
pj
=
Ajjhfj
Aiihfi

zj (x)
zi (x)
1=
; i; j = s; h: (50)
14The reason we cannot explain the whole rise in the wage ratio is that we assume nite :
15Other potential factors include the decline in labor marker discrimination against women or changes in attitudes
towards working women in both the labor and marriage markets (see Fernandez, 2013). Modelling these types of
gender-biased shifts is outside the scope of our paper.
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As the e¢ ciency units of one hour of work are rising for women relative to men, the market
parameter b1 and bs are falling over time. This has a qualitatively similar impact to allowing 1
and s to grow in a model without human capital. In other words, the rise in womens human
capital would have e¤ects that go in the same direction as the e¤ects of structural transformation.
It is clear from expressions (49) and (50) that whether or not human capital is productive in the
household has key implications. If human capital is not useful at home, hmh = hfh = 1; then home
production bh is equal to ah; which is a constant, thus market parameters b1 and bs are falling rela-
tive to bh: Moreover, the extent of marketization in (33) now depends on (   1)

s   h + hf

,
as shown in the expression for the relative price (50), where hf denotes the growth in womens
human capital.16 Therefore womens accumulation of human capital delivers more intensive mar-
ketization, in turn implying a higher rise in female market hours and the service share, and a
smaller rise in the wage ratio.
To assess the quantitative impact of human capital accumulation, we introduce it into our
model by simply matching the growth in hm and hf to the gender-specic evolution of human
capital observed in the data. Specically, we estimate wage equations on the CPS for 1968-
2009, including a female dummy, age and its square, a race dummy, education dummies and
year dummies. The schooling categories are: high school dropout (drop), high school completed
(hs), some college (sc), and college completed (cc). We the use the coe¢ cients on the education
dummies to construct the human capital index hgt for each gender in each year as
hgt = (xdrop;gt + exp(hs)xhs;gt + exp(sc)xsc;gt + exp(cc)xcc;gt);
where the x0s are shares of the gender-specic population in each schooling category, and the 0s
are the associated coe¢ cients from the wage regression (dropouts being the excluded category).
Using these indices, we nd that the gender ratio in human capital has risen from 0.98 to
1.02 during 1968-2009, with an average growth of 0.11% per year. We use these numbers to
calibrate hf=hm: When human capital is equally productive in the market and home production,
i.e. hgh = hg, the driving forces of labor market changes are still (1   s) and (s   h), as in
the baseline model. However, when human capital is not productive at home (hfh = hmh = 1),
as previously explained, the relevant driving forces are (1   s) and

s   h + hf

, where hf
is estimated to be 0:49% per year. Finally, note that the wage ratio x in the model with human
capital is calibrated to unadjusted wage ratio, which increases from 0.63 in 1968 to 0.81 in 2009.
Row (3) and (4) of Table 6 report the quantitative results for each case, respectively. The main
changes in the quantitative results happen when human capital is only useful in the market (row
(4)). Two forces are at work here. First, the rise in hf=hm at 0.11% implies a fall in b1 and bs at
0.1% relative to bh, with similar e¤ects to the gender-biased shift in labor demand represented in
row (2), in which a1 and as are falling exogenously at 0.5% per year. Second, the rise in womens
16Similarily, the extent of marketization for mens hours depends on (   1)  2m   2h + hm ; where hm
denotes the growth in mens human capital.
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relative human capital strengthens marketization, thereby reinforcing the models prediction for
f and f=m: Together, comparing row (4) and row (1), these two forces double the models
predictions on f and f=m: On the other hand, this worsens the models prediction for the fall
in mens market hours.
5.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We nally perform some sensitivity analysis on parameters "; ; s   h and : The results are
reported in Table 7.
In our baseline we set  = 3, but in row 2 we allow for a higher elasticity  = 10: Comparing
rows 1 and 2 shows that all baseline predictions remained virtually unchanged, except the model
now can only account for 11% of the rise in the wage ratio. The reason is that with higher ; one
now needs a smaller female comparative advantage in services to match wage and hours ratios,
according to equation (8). In particular the implied (1; s; h) values become (0.40, 0.44, 0.45),
and 1 and s are too close for structural transformation to have a signicant e¤ect on the wage
ratio.
The next four rows let the strength of marketization and structural transformation vary, ac-
cording to alternative levels of ("; ; s   h) : The results are reported in rows (3)-(6) and show
that our baseline predictions on the relative gender outcomes x and f=m are robust, while the
prediction on the fall in m is not robust to higher elasticity of substitution between market and
home services.
Given that our utility structure is similar to that of Ngai and Pissarides (2008), we use their
benchmark value of " = 0:1, which implies a reduction in the intensity of structural transformation.
Comparing row (3) to row (1), predictions improve slightly for the males service share sf and
female market hours f , but slightly worsen in most other dimensions, consistent with Propositions
1-4.
Next, we consider  = 3; which is above the upper bound of 2.3 found for the elasticity
of substitution across home services and all market commodities, and implies an increase in the
marketization force. Comparing rows (1) and (4), the prediction for female market hours f almost
double, the prediction for the female service share sf improves slightly, while the predictions for s
and sm deteriorate slightly. But the major di¤erence is the predicted rise - as opposed to a fall - in
male market hours m: Male maret hours are now predicted to rise the strong marketization force
is su¢ cient to attract even men to the market service sector. Despite this, the model explains 15
extra percentage points of the rise in f=m: Finally, the wage ratio is predicted to rise slightly
less than in the baseline case. Again all these results are qualitatively consistent with Propositions
1-4.
We next lower the productivity growth di¤erential between market and home services s  h.
Our baseline calibration uses the estimate of home productivity growth obtained by Bridgman
(2013). The same paper also notes, however, that the estimate for h rises slightly if an alter-
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native price deator is used. Thus we next set s   h = 0:4%, which is also the value used
by Ngai and Pissarides (2008), and consistent with zero TFP growth in the home sector.17 This
delivers an improvement in the male service share and male market hours (sm; m) ; due to weaker
marketization. But clearly the predictions for
 
s; sf ; f ; f=m

deteriorate.
Finally, to corroborate our previous discussion on the equilibrium e¤ects of a higher wage ratio
on the service share in Section 3.2, we adopt Ngai and Pissarides (2008) calibration, by setting
" = 0:1 and s  h = 0:4% simultaneously. Results reported in row (6) show that the model now
predicts 72% of the rise in the service share, which is nearly identical to 73% prediction of Ngai
and Pissarides (2008), thus conrming that the equilibrium e¤ect of x on s is small. As already
stated, the main value-added of our framework is its set of predictions in the gender dimension,
and our baseline results together with various sensitivity checks show that the model performs
quite well in this aspect.
6 Conclusion
The narrowing of gender gaps in wages and market hours and the reallocation of labor from
manufacturing into services are two of the most remarkable stylized facts of the post-war period.
Motivated by these facts, we model an economy three sectors: goods, services and home, in which
women have a comparative advantage in the production of services, both in the market and at
home. Productivity growth is faster in market sectors than in home production, and, within the
market, it is faster in manufacturing than in services. Both developments are women-friendly
because women are both more likely to work in market services and are the main providers of
home services. Marketization frees womens time from the home and structural transformation
creates the jobs that the women can do in the market.
When calibrated to the U.S. economy, our model does a very good job in predicting the
evolution of both the overall service share, and the involvement of each gender in producing
services. The model also explains one-third of the narrowing gender gaps in wages and market
hours.
17As shown by Bridgman (2013), and used in our baseline, s   h can be higher than the di¤erence in the
correspinding TFP growth rates if, for example, market services are more capital intensive than home services, as
falling relative price of capital will raise s   h. On the other hand, it is also possible for s   h to fall short
of the di¤erence in TFP growth if biased technological progress reduces the relative price of household durables
(Greenwood et al. 2004), thus beneting the home sector relativel more.
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7 Appendix
7.1 The Model
7.1.1 Deriving equilibrium conditions (9) and (12)
From equation (8), Lmj can be expressed as function of Lfj :
Lmj = (ajx)
 Lfj
Substituting into the resource constraint (7) for g = m gives
(a1x)
 Lf1 + (a2x)
 Lf2 = Lm
Together with the resource constraint (7) for g = f we obtain (9). Using the utility function (4)
and production function (5), equalization of VMPL for Lf1 and Lf2:
!
1  !

y2
y1
1="
=
2A2
1A1

L2=Lf2
L1=Lf1
1=
rewrite as
!
1  !

A2Lf2
A1Lf1
1="
=
2A2
1A1

L2=Lf2
L1=Lf1
1= 1="
solving for
Lf1
Lf2
=

!
1  !
"
A2
A1
1 "
1
2
"
L2=Lf2
L1=Lf1
1 "=
(51)
obtain (10) by denition (11). Finally use the resource constraint for female to derive (12).
7.1.2 Unique Equilibrium
Lemma 5 Any equilibrium wage ratio x 2 [x1; x2] ; where xj  1aj

Lm
Lf
1=
; j = 1; 2:
Proof. Any equilibrium x must imply Lf1
F
2 [0; 1] : Using the rst equilibrium condition (9), it
requires a1 6 x  LmLf 6 a2
; result follows.
Lemma 6 For any x 2 [x1; x2], T (x1) > D (x) > T (x2) ; i.e. equilibrium x exists.
Proof. Note T (x1) = 1 and T (x2) = 0; but for any x 2 [x1; x2] ; 0 < h (x) < 1; result follows.
Lemma 7 For any equilibrium x; T 0 (x) < D0 (x) :
Proof. From (9), T 0 (:) < 0: From (12)
D0 (x) =
R0 (x)
[1 +R (x)]2
;
R0 (x)
R (x)
=
(   ") (a2   a1)x 2
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1)
:
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Given a1 > a2; if  6 "; D0 (:) > 0: If  > "; then D0 (:) < 0: From (9) and (12)
T 0 (x) =
 x  1
a1   a2

Lm
Lf

; D0 (x) =
R0 (x)
[1 +R (x)]2
;
where using (10)
R0 (x)
R (x)
=
(   ") (a2   a1)x 2
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1)
< 0
Using T 0 (:), D0 (:), and denition of x; at any x = x
T 0 (x) D0 (x)
=
 x  1
a1   a2

Lm
Lf

  R (x)
[1 +R (x)]2
R0 (x)
R (x)
=
x  1
a1   a2

Lm
Lf

    xR
0 (x)
R (x) [1 +R (x)]

+
a2
a1   a2
R0 (x)
R (x) [1 +R (x)]
the second term is negative, and the term in the bracket is
    xR
0 (x)
R (x) [1 +R (x)]
= 

(a1   a2)x 1
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1) [1 +R (x)]
  1

  "

(a1   a2)x 1
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1) [1 +R (x)]

=
 
1 +R (x)

2a2x
 1 + 1 + a2x 1a1x 1
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1)
+R (x)

  " (a1   a2)x
 1
(1 + a2x 1) (1 + a1x 1) [1 +R (x)]
Given a1 > a2; T 0 (x) D0 (x) < 0 for any x = x:
Proposition 8 Equilibrium x is unique.
Proof. For any x 2 [x1; x2] ; T 0 (:) < 0: If  6 "; D0 (:) > 0; x is unique. If  > "; D0 (:) > 0;.
The number of equilibrium is an odd number, so among any multiple equilibria one of them must
imply T 0 (x) > D0 (x) which contradicts Lemma 7.
7.1.3 Aggregation across market and home
Rewrite the production function (15) as
cj = AjLfj
"
2 + (1  2)

Lmj
Lfj
  1

# 
 1
j = s; h:
which implies
cs
ch
=
As
Ah

Lfs
Lfh

=

 As
(1   )Ah

(52)
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where the last equality follows from (18). Substituting into (14) ;
c2 = cs
"
 + (1   )

 As
(1   )Ah
1 #  1
using denition of Rmh in (18),
c2 = cs

 

1 +Rmh
Rmh
 
 1
: (53)
Finally, using (15), (17) and (18)
cs = As
"
2

Rmh
1 +Rmh
Lf2
  1

+ (1  2)

Rmh
1 +Rmh
Lm2
  1

# 
 1
substitute into (53), the productivity index for the hypothetical production of c2 is
A2 = As
Rmh
1 +Rmh

 

1 +Rmh
Rmh
 
 1
= As 

 1

Rmh
1 +Rmh
  1
 1
results for 2 follows from taking time derivative and using denition of Rmh in (18).
7.2 Calibration and Computation
7.2.1 Baseline Model
Here we give details on (1) how we match the levels of
 
s; sf ; sm; f ; m

for the average of 2005-
2009 and (2) how productivity growth di¤erences jk between sector j and sector k is computed.
Matching 2005-2009 The time allocation by each gender g = m; f are
Lgj
Lg
=
8<:
g (1  sg) j = 1
gsg j = s
1  g j = h
9=; ; (54)
which are uniquely pinned down by the data on
 
sf ; sm; f ; m

: The gender hours ratios in the
production function are
Lfj
Lmj
=
8>>><>>>:
1 sf
1 sm

f
m

Lf
Lm

j = 1
sf
sm

f
m

Lf
Lm

j = 1
1 f
1 m

Lf
Lm

j = 1
9>>>=>>>; ; (55)
which depends on the level of Lf
Lm
which can be set to match the service employment share:
s =
Lms + Lfs
Lm1 + Lf1 + Lms + Lfs
(56)
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rewrite it as
1
s
= 1 +

Lm1
Lm

Lf
Lfs

Lm
Lf

+
Lf1
Lfs
Lms
Lm

Lf
Lfs

Lm
Lf

+ 1
: (57)
Using (54) and (55), we can derive
Lf
Lm
=

1 sm
sm

   1 s
s

 
1 s
s
  1 sf
sf
 msm
sff

: (58)
Thus given data on
 
sf ; sm; f ; m

;
Lf
Lm
in 2005-2009 is set to match s in the data, which in turns
determine the hours ratio (55) in the model.
Given data on relative wage x and hours ratio, we compute j from equilibrium equation (8) .
Finally, we match the time allocation in (54) by setting the levels of relative productivity Ajk  AjAk
and preference parameters (!;  ) : Given data on time allocation (Lfj; Lmj)j=1;s;h and gender wage
ratio

x =
wf
wm

; we can compute
Ij  wfLfj
pjcj
=
Lfj
Lfj +
wm
wf
Lmj
:
and across sector j and sector k
Ejk =
Lfj
Lfk
pjcj
wfLfj
wfLfk
pkck
=
Lfj
Lfk
Ik
Ij
:
Using computed j from equilibrium equation (8) and the data, we derive
zj (x) =
Lj
Lfj
=
 
j +
 
1  j
Lmj
Lfj
  1

! 
 1
; (59)
which give values for
Akpk
Ajpj
=
j (zj (x))
1=
k (zk (x))
1=
: (60)
From marketization (33), we can write
Es;h =

ps
ph
1  
 
1   

=

Asps
Ahph
1  
Ah
As
1  
 
1   

;
so together with (60), we can compute an e¤ective relative productivity in 2009
A^s;h 

As
Ah

1   
 
 
1 
=

Asps
Ahph

1
Es;h
 1
1 
: (61)
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Similarly from structure transformation (35), we can write
E1;s =

!
1  !
"
 
 "
 1

ps
p1
1 "
M
where
M 
"
1 +

1   
 
 
ps
ph
 1# " 1
=

1 +
1
Es;h
 "
 1
;
so together with (60), we can compute
A^1;s 

A1
As

1  !
!
 "
1 "
 
 "
1  "
1 " =
A1p1
Asps

M
E1;s
 1
1 "
: (62)
The growth rate of A^jk is simply jk  j   k:
Matching productivity growth Finally we describe how we obtain (1   s) : Using data
from Burea of Economic Analysis, we compute the real labour productivity growth in service and
non-service sector, _B
B
, where
Yj = Bj (Lfj + Lmj) ; (63)
where Yj is the real value-added of sector j and Lgj is the hours of work by gender g = m; f: Using
BEA data, Bj is simply real value-added per hour. We nd B1 = 2:47% and B2 = 1:24%; so the
di¤erence across the two sectors is 1.22%. To link Bj to j in the model, rewrite (63) as
Yj = LjBj
(Lfj + Lmj)
Lj
;
where Lj is the CES form of male and female labour hours as in the model (??), so we have
Aj = Bj

Lfj + Lmj
Lj

We can rewrite it as
Aj = Bj

Lfj + Lmj
Lfj

Lfj
Lj

;
where we can obtain the rst two terms directly from the data and the last term from the model,
where Lj
Lfj
is derived in before in (59).
To summarize, the growth rate we are interested is
_Aj
Aj
=
_Bj
Bj
 
_Ifj
jfj
+
_zj
zj
; (64)
where from (59)
_zj
zj
=  
 
1  j
 Lmj
Lfj
 
 1
j +
 
1  j
 Lmj
Lfj
 
 1
0@ Lmj=Lfj
Lmj=Lfj
1A
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where Ifj  LfjLfj+Lmj is the intensity of female hours in sector j:
Together with the average
_Bj
Bj
from 1968-2009 from BEA, we can calibrate
_Aj
Aj
using CPS data
1968-2009 related to gender, i.e. the hours ratio across gender

Lmj=Lfj
Lmj=Lfj
: We obtain (1   s) =
1:17%, which is very close to the di¤erence in the real productivity growth.
The computation algorithm is as follow: given (1   s) = 1:2% and (s   h) = 0:4%; we
have the time series for A^jkt; which allows us to solve for Ejkt and Ijt: Together with
Lf
Lm
; we can
derive the gender wage ratio

wf
wm
(t)

from (44) and female labour supply using (37).
7.2.2 Extended model with human capital
The calibration is exactly the same as before with the presence of the term hmj=hfj starting from
equation (59)
Lj
hfjLfj
=
 
j +
 
1  j
hmjLmj
hfjLfj
  1

! 
 1
; (65)
which give values for
Akhfkpk
Ajhfjpj
=
j (zj (x))
1=
k (zk (x))
1=
: (66)
The relative expenditure Es;h is modied to
Es;h =

ps
ph
1  
 
1   

=

Aspshfs
Ahphhfh
1  
Ahhfh
Ashfs
1  
 
1   

;
so the e¤ective relative productivity
A^s;h 

Ashfs
Ahhfh

1   
 
 
1 
=

Aspshfs
Ahphhfh

1
Es;h
 1
1 
: (67)
which has a growth rate s   h + hf if human capital is not useful at home.
The growth rate 1 and s are in principle di¤erent from the values calibrated for the baseline
model because of the presence of human capital. As before, we rewrite
Aj =
Bj
hf

Lfj + Lmj
Lfj

hfjLfj
Lj

;
where we can obtain the rst two terms directly from the data and the last term from the model,
where Lj
hfjLfj
is derived in (65). With some algebra we have
_Aj
Aj
=
_Bj
Bj
 
_hf
hf
 
_Ifj
Ifj
+
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 
j +
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 
0@ hf=hm
hf=hm
+

Lfj=Lmj
Lfj=Lmj
1A ;
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or as
_Aj
Aj
=
_Bj
Bj
 
0B@ j
j +
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 
_hf
hf
+
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 
j +
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 
_hm
hm
1CA
 
_Ifj
Ifj
+
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 
j +
 
1  j
  hfLfj
hmLmj
 
1 

Lfj=Lmj
Lfj=Lmj
;
In addition to the information for the baseline model, we also use CPS data for the growth rate
of human capital for each gender

_hf
hf
;
_hm
hm

: We obtain 1  s = 1:20% which is very close to the
numbers we found for the baseline model. This is not surprising given the our measure of growth
in human capital are very small.
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share of women's men's women's men's women's/ wage ratio
services hours: hours hours: hours: men's: adjusted
services/ services/ market/ market/ market/
total market total market total total total
data 2005-09 0.751 0.882 0.646 0.460 0.683 0.672 0.775
data 1968-72 0.582 0.749 0.507 0.355 0.776 0.458 0.641
Baseline model 1968-72 0.583 0.766 0.444 0.413 0.693 0.596 0.729
% explained 99.5% 87.2% 145.7% 44.3% 10.9% 35.6% 34.4%
No structural transformation model 1968-72 0.685 0.842 0.564 0.390 0.639 0.610 0.759
γ₁-γs = 0 % explained 38.6% 30.4% 58.7% 67.1% -48.1% 29.2% 11.3%
No marketization model 1968-72 0.658 0.819 0.524 0.480 0.728 0.659 0.729
γs-γh = 0 % explained 54.6% 47.5% 87.7% -19.4% 48.4% 6.3% 34.4%
No relative supply change: model 1968-72 0.583 0.771 0.450 0.411 0.689 0.596 0.748
Lf/Lm is constant % explained 99.1% 83.4% 140.6% 46.5% 6.6% 35.5% 20.1%
Table 5: Baseline Results
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share of women's men's women's men's women's/ wage ratio wage ratio
services hours: hours hours: hours: men's: adjusted raw
services/ services/ market/ market/ market/
total market total market total total total
data 2005-09 0.751 0.882 0.646 0.460 0.683 0.672 0.775 0.805
data 1968-72 0.582 0.749 0.507 0.355 0.776 0.458 0.641 0.632
Baseline model 1968-72 0.583 0.766 0.444 0.413 0.693 0.596 0.729
% explained 99.5% 87.2% 145.7% 44.3% 10.9% 35.6% 34.4%
Exogenous gender-biased demand shift model 1968-72 0.583 0.783 0.468 0.335 0.735 0.456 0.666
ξi/(1-ξi) grows at 0.5%, i=1,s % explained 99.0% 74.5% 128.3% 119.1% 55.9% 100.8% 81.6%
Case (A): Human capital is useful everywhere model 1968-72 0.586 0.769 0.447 0.412 0.691 0.596 0.738
% explained 97.5% 85.1% 142.8% 45.6% 8.5% 35.6% 38.8%
Case (B): Human capital useful only in the market model 1968-72 0.530 0.728 0.395 0.367 0.684 0.537 0.746
% explained 130.5% 115.5% 180.6% 88.4% 0.8% 63.1% 34.0%
Table 6: Other Gender-Biased Shocks
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share of women's men's women's men's women's/ wage ratio
services hours: hours hours: hours: men's: adjusted
services/ services/ market/ market/ market/
total market total market total total total
data 2005-09 0.751 0.882 0.646 0.460 0.683 0.672 0.775
data 1968-72 0.582 0.749 0.507 0.355 0.776 0.458 0.641
Baseline model 1968-72 0.583 0.766 0.444 0.413 0.693 0.596 0.729
% explained 99.5% 87.2% 145.7% 44.3% 10.9% 35.6% 34.4%
Higher elasticity of substitution, male and female model 1968-72 0.585 0.767 0.445 0.417 0.696 0.599 0.760
η = 10 % explained 98.3% 86.2% 144.3% 41.2% 13.4% 34.3% 10.7%
Higher elasticity of substitution, goods&services model 1968-72 0.597 0.778 0.460 0.410 0.685 0.597 0.733
ε=0.1 % explained 91.0% 78.5% 133.9% 48.0% 2.3% 35.0% 30.9%
Higher elasticity of substitution, home&market services model 1968-72 0.554 0.745 0.416 0.375 0.667 0.563 0.734
σ =3 % explained 116.7% 102.7% 165.4% 81.0% -18.2% 51.1% 30.6%
Lower productivity growth diffeernce, home&market services model 1968-72 0.617 0.791 0.479 0.441 0.707 0.623 0.729
γs-γh = 0.4% % explained 79.1% 68.5% 119.8% 18.2% 25.7% 23.0% 34.1%
Ngai-Pissarides (2008): home&market services model 1968-72 0.630 0.800 0.494 0.438 0.701 0.624 0.733
ε=0.1, γs-γh = 0.4% % explained 71.6% 61.3% 109.2% 21.1% 18.8% 22.4% 31.1%
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis
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Figure 1:  
Trends in (Market) Working Hours and Wages by Gender 
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Figure 2:  
Trends in Gender Wage Ratios by Sector 
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Figure 3 
Trends in market work and home production by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Equilibrium wage ratio x=wf/wm 
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